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I.

INTRODUCTION

The twenty-first century dawned ominously for immigration
law. While many of the changes to U.S. immigration law we discuss
in this article occurred just before the turn of the twenty-first
century, it is our observation that the September 11, 2001, terrorist
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attacks and America’s launch of the war on terror led directly to
the current atmosphere of enforcement—first by the agencies
responsible for administering U.S. immigration laws. This has
included renewed energy for the deportation of non-U.S. citizens
convicted of a wide range of crimes, both violent and non-violent.
There are numerous fascinating legal areas into which any
discussion of immigration could tend to take us, including federal
versus state power, labor law, income taxation and Social Security,
refugee issues—not to mention policy discussions about whether
1
and how to change our immigration laws —and what, if anything,
2
to do about illegal immigrants in the United States (a population
3
most recently estimated at almost twelve million). Our aim in this
article is more modest: we will focus on immigration consequences
1. The main body of immigration laws is the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, which has been amended numerous times and is commonly referred
to by all immigration agencies and courts as the “INA.” The INA appears in the
U.S. Code at Title 8, Chapter 12. Because the numbering of sections within the
INA does not exactly correspond to those same sections’ numbering in Title 8 of
the U.S. Code, this article will give the corresponding 8 U.S.C. section number for
any INA section cited.
2. This article will use the term “illegal” to describe the legal status of those
foreign citizens who do not currently have an approved, unexpired immigration
status authorized by the Department of Homeland Security. The supposedly less
offensive term “undocumented” is simply not suitable to a professional level
discussion of immigration law because it implies that it is the mere lack of a piece
of paper that determines whether or not a foreign citizen has the right to be in the
United States. The term “undocumented” obscures the fact that ultimately
immigration documents either are or are not issued based upon legal rights. The
terms “legal” and “illegal” place the proper emphasis on the fact that it is the law
(with interpretation and application) that determines whether a foreign citizen
has an unexpired right to be in the United States. Furthermore, the term
“undocumented” would only cover those foreign citizens who cross into the
United States illegally from the very start (those who “enter without inspection,”
commonly referred to as having “EWI’d,” usually across the southern border). By
contrast, the term “illegal” properly includes not only those who have EWI’d but
also those many tens of thousands who were in fact initially admitted lawfully on a
visa (such as a visitor’s visa) and then overstayed the permitted temporary period
of time, or who though lawfully admitted on a visa then engaged in activity
(usually employment) that is not permitted for their particular nonimmigrant visa
category. The term “illegal” also includes those foreign citizens who used fake
documents (such as someone else’s valid passport) to enter the United States
through a proper port of entry such as an international airport—such an
individual was “documented” but committed an act of fraud that complicates the
individual’s immigration case in the future in ways very different from someone
who EWI’d.
3. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, TRENDS IN
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION: UNDOCUMENTED INFLOW NOW TRAILS LEGAL INFLOW
(2008), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/94.pdf.
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of criminal convictions, with an eye to Minnesota-specific examples
that illustrate the topics we address.
We do not intend for this article to be a comprehensive
practice guide for practicing immigration attorneys and criminal
defense attorneys—even limited to the issue of immigration
consequences of criminal convictions, the topic is much too broad
for a single article to serve as a tool for daily practice. There are
4
several well-reputed practice guides available to the criminal
defense and immigration bars, as well as one Minnesota-specific
manual prepared by a highly reputed, then-local, immigration
5
attorney for use by public defenders. Rather, our more modest
goal in this article is to present the general legal community with a
glimpse into the sometimes Kafkaesque world of immigration, and
to provide judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and law clerks
alike with an appreciation for the immigration ramifications of
criminal proceedings. It is precisely because the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions can be so harsh (with little
6
room for discretionary relief by the time a deportation case is

4. See, e.g., DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORI ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
CRIMES (Nat’l Law. Guild); NORTON TOOBY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS (4th
ed. 2007).
5. MARIA BALDINI-POTERMIN, DEFENDING ALIENS IN MINNESOTA COURTS: A
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF IMMIGRATION LAW AND CLIENT SCENARIOS (1999). A
version of this resource was published in Law and Inequality: A Journal of Theory
and Practice, 17 LAW & INEQ. 567 (1999). To the best of the author’s knowledge,
there has not been an opportunity for this manual to be updated since 1999, and
thus certain conclusions it reaches must be modified in light of the past nine years
of immigration case law. It remains, however, an exceptionally useful and wellwritten presentation with practical advice for real cases.
6. The term “deportation” is somewhat outdated. The original Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952 distinguished between “deportation” proceedings (for
foreigners who had entered the United States, whether legally or not) and
“exclusion” proceedings (for foreigners who had not made an entry to the United
States, i.e., were apprehended while trying to enter the United States even if later
physically paroled into the United States to await exclusion proceedings). Compare
INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251–52 (2006) (exclusion proceedings) with INA
§ 242(b) (removal proceedings). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996 merged these two separate kinds of
proceedings into a single “removal” proceeding. See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 304, 110 Stat. 3009–588 (1996) (creating present-day INA § 240 removal
proceedings). Despite this change from “deportation proceedings” to “removal
proceedings,” the term “deportable” is maintained in the statute and continues to
be used. See, e.g., INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (“deportable aliens”). Since
“deportation” remains the word in general usage among the public outside the
realm of Immigration Court, this article will use the terms “deportable” and
“deportation” instead of “removable” and “removal.”

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 11

138

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.35:1

before an immigration judge) that immigration considerations
must figure into criminal defense strategy.
To frame the discussion properly, we will first briefly look at
7
the all-critical distinction between citizens and aliens. We will then
turn to the “collateral consequences” doctrine that is at the heart of
the problem of deportation, resulting sometimes unintentionally as
8
the result of certain criminal convictions. We will pause briefly to
consider the recent instance of the complete dissolution of the
civil–criminal divide in the case of criminal proceedings that from
their very inception are designed to achieve deportation as the
9
outcome. We will then turn to the immigration laws’ very broad
definition of “conviction” that goes well beyond what most states’
10
law would consider a conviction. This will lead us to consider
strategies both pre- and post-criminal court process that may arise
in the cases of immigrants facing criminal charges or who already
11
have criminal “convictions” for immigration purposes.
Where
appropriate, we will use Minnesota-specific examples to illustrate
how immigration laws apply.
II. CITIZENS VS. ALIENS—WHO IS AT RISK OF DEPORTATION?
It is the authors’ experience that in everyday speech, the
concepts of “citizen” and “alien” often are blurred. It is common
for native-born American citizens to think that when foreigners
“get legal” they have become actual U.S. citizens. However, in truth
it is very uncommon for foreign citizens to go from having no U.S.
12
immigration status directly into U.S. citizenship.
For most
foreigners, “getting legal” refers to becoming a Lawful Permanent
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See infra Parts VI–VII.
12. One narrow exception is the provision for children who are born outside
the United States to a U.S. citizen parent (but do not automatically acquire U.S.
citizenship at birth) and who continue to reside abroad. INA § 322, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1433 (2006). This provision allows certain such children under the age of
eighteen to enter the United States as a temporary visitor, at which time a brief
interview is conducted and U.S. citizenship conferred, so that the child goes
directly into U.S. citizenship status without ever having first become a Lawful
Permanent Resident. See id. This provision for children residing abroad is the
counterpart of a provision that applies to children of U.S. citizens where the family
resides in the United States. Compare INA § 322, 8 U.S.C. § 1433 with INA § 320, 8
U.S.C. § 1431 (2008). See also 3A C.J.S. Aliens § 1824 (2008).
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Resident (LPR). LPR status is the right to reside permanently and
13
work in the United States without restriction.
Achieving LPR status is usually the end result of a tortuous
(and torturous) process, often through more than one federal
14
agency. Approval of Permanent Residence is genuine cause for
13. More accurately, “the term ‘lawfully admitted for permanent residence’
means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the
immigration laws, such status not having changed.” INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(20). Permanent Resident status may be “abandoned” by voluntary
relinquishment or involuntarily through either spending too much time outside
the United States or taking other actions inconsistent with residing permanently in
the United States, such as taking full-time employment abroad, purchasing a
primary home abroad, and/or claiming nonresident status to reduce U.S. income
tax liability. See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Abandonment of Lawful
Permanent-Resident Status, 193 A.L.R. FED. 673 (2004). For a comprehensive
discussion of how to avoid abandonment of Permanent Residence, including a
thorough scholarly discussion of the applicable federal and immigration case law,
see Gary Endelman & Cyrus Mehta, Home is Where the Card Is: How to Preserve Lawful
Permanent Resident Status in a Global Economy, 13 Bender’s Immigration Bulletin 849
(2008). For purposes of this article, it is only necessary to consider Permanent
Residents who reside in the United States and who have not abandoned their
status. If a Permanent Resident is deported from the United States (usually
because of a criminal conviction), the status of Permanent Resident is
automatically rescinded. See INA § 246(a), 8 U.S.C. S 1256(a) (2006).
14. The main federal agency charged with administration and enforcement
of the immigration laws is the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See
INA § 103, 8 U.S.C. § 1103. DHS subdivides its immigration functions into three
sub-agencies: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), primarily
charged with approving immigration benefits such as I-485 applications to adjust
to permanent resident status; Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which
includes the Border Patrol and which inspects all foreign citizens arriving at
international airports and land/sea ports of entry who seek lawful admission on
either a temporary or permanent basis; and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) charged with apprehending and removing foreigners subject
to deportation. See Noël L. Griswold, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 207
(2005). Some immigration functions, however, are handled by the U.S.
Department of State (DOS), which issues visas through U.S. Embassies and
Consulates overseas and the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), which has a role in
cases concerning both temporary and permanent employment of foreign citizens
in the United States. Each of these agencies publishes regulations that appear in
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as well as other various memoranda,
cables, and letters that do not have the force of regulatory authority but
nonetheless are highly relevant to the daily practice of immigration law. Unless
needed to illustrate a specific point, this article will not provide the CFR cites that
correspond to and clarify the procedures concerning particular INA provisions.
For the issues raised in this article, the case law of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) and the federal courts is more often the authority that interprets
the provisions of the INA as they apply to criminal convictions versus the agencies’
regulations.
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celebration, yet it is still a far cry from being a U.S. citizen.
Becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen is a separate process that in
most cases requires first being a Permanent Resident for at least
15
five years. Many Permanent Residents never become U.S. citizens,
either by choice or because they are unable to meet the
requirement to demonstrate an ability to read, write, and speak
16
words in ordinary usage in English, or are unable to demonstrate
17
“good moral character” for the applicable period of time.
For law abiding Permanent Residents who do not incur any
criminal convictions, being a Permanent Resident (but not a U.S.
citizen) might not make much difference in their day-to-day life.
Permanent Residents can work for any employer of their choice, be
self-employed, or not be employed at all if they are financially
18
supported. Permanent Residents may buy and sell property, and
even hold political office so long as U.S. citizenship is not a
19
requirement for such positions. The main right that U.S. citizens
20
have, which Permanent Residents do not have, is the right to vote.
The distinction between being a LPR versus a U.S. citizen,
however, comes into stark relief when criminal convictions arise. It
comes as a shock to some Permanent Residents that they are still
subject to deportation from the United States for a wide variety of
crimes. The distinction between having Permanent Resident status
21
versus having one of the lesser immigration statuses is not
15. See INA § 316, 8 U.S.C. § 1427. For certain spouses of U.S. citizens, the
required period of Permanent Residence is reduced to three years or shorter. Cf.
INA § 319(a), (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a), (b).
16. INA § 312(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1423(a)(1).
17. See INA § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (requirements for naturalization to
U.S. citizenship, including “good moral character”) and INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(f) (defining certain categorical cases where good moral character is
lacking).
18. 3 C.J.S. Aliens § 48 (2008).
19. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).
20. If a Permanent Resident votes in any federal, state, or local election and
such voting violates a federal, state, or local law restricting voting to U.S. citizens
only, the Permanent Resident becomes deportable with virtually no chance of
relief from deportation. See INA § 237(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6). For a
comprehensive discussion of state and local laws permitting or prohibiting voting
by non-U.S. citizens, including policy arguments in favor of allowing Permanent
Residents to vote, see Elise Brozovich, Prospects for Democratic Change: Noncitizen
Suffrage in America, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 403 (2002).
21. Lower down in the hierarchy of immigration status are “nonimmigrants,”
who are foreign citizens admitted to the United States on a visa that limits them to
a specific activity for a specific, definite period of time. Common examples are
foreign citizens who enter the United States on a B-1/B-2 visitor’s visa with
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controlling on the issue of deportability for criminal activity—
having secured Permanent Resident status does not provide
immunity from deportation when it comes to criminal activity.
Rather, the key distinction is between citizens and aliens. In
short, an alien is any person who is not a citizen of the United
22
States. Aliens may be deported, while citizens may not. It is as
simple as that. When it comes to deportation for criminal activity,
being a Permanent Resident versus having one of the lesser alien
23
24
Very little discretionary
statuses offers little additional relief.
relief is available for Immigration Judges to consider applying to
Permanent Residents who face deportation for certain criminal
convictions. For certain criminal convictions, the determination of
whether or not an alien will be deported is more categorical—
either the outcome of criminal proceedings will result in no
permission to stay up to six months (without work authorization); F-1 students
attending a college or university to earn a Bachelor or higher degree; and H-1B
temporary workers in “specialty occupations.” See generally INA § 101(a)(15), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15). Many nonimmigrants aspire to become Permanent
Residents through employer sponsorship, though not all are successful. Other
legal immigration statuses that are less than full Permanent Residence include
refugee/asylee status (which allows applying for Permanent Residence after a oneyear waiting period) and Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for individuals from
certain countries designated in the Federal Register on a sporadic basis. See INA
§§ 207–08, 244, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157–58, 1254a.
22. More accurately, “the term ‘alien’ means any person not a citizen or
national of the United States.” INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (emphasis
added). The term “national of the United States” in turn is defined as either an
actual U.S. citizen or “a person who, though not a citizen of the United States,
owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” INA § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(22). This narrow category applies mainly to individuals born in certain
outlying possessions of the United States. See INA § 308, 8 U.S.C. § 1408. For
purposes of this article, the distinction between “citizen” and “national” is
unimportant, since nationals are not “aliens” and thus not subject to deportation.
23. See supra note 21. For other non-criminal grounds of deportability, the
distinction between being a Permanent Resident versus a temporary
nonimmigrant or an illegal alien is more significant. For example, the grounds of
deportation for having entered illegally, INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B), or for having entered legally but later fallen out of temporary
nonimmigrant status, INA § 237(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C), do not apply
to a Permanent Resident.
24. See e.g., INA § 236(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (requiring mandatory detention
of aliens deportable for criminal convictions, regardless of whether or not the
alien is a long-time Permanent Resident). See also, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510
(2003) (rejecting constitutional challenge by Permanent Resident to mandatory
detention under INA § 236(c) and noting “[i]n sum, the detention at stake under
[INA § 236(c)] lasts roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in
which it is invoked, and about five months in the minority of cases in which the
alien chooses to appeal.”).
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deportability or will result in near-certain deportability because the
forms of relief available in Immigration Court are virtually
25
eliminated.
Many immigration attorneys have witnessed the spectacle of
aliens who became Permanent Residents at a young age (through
family-based immigration, or whose family was granted refugee or
asylee status and became Permanent Residents later, or who came
26
through adoption) only to be deported to the country they left as
infants or as young children. While it is not the authors’ intention
to downplay the seriousness of crimes committed by aliens who are
subject to deportation, such cases involving lifelong Permanent
Residents who did not become automatic U.S. citizens are
especially tragic. Many such Permanent Residents were not aware
that they were not U.S. citizens and have grown up culturally as
Americans, with little or no knowledge of the country from which
they were adopted. Yet, under deportability grounds for criminal
convictions, their long period of residence often does not factor
25. See infra note 36 (listing commonly sought forms of relief from
deportation). Attention concerning the issue of deportability for criminal
convictions tends to focus on aliens who are Permanent Residents, because aliens
who have fallen out of status or who have never had any valid immigration status
in the first place are much more easily deported under the grounds related to
expiration of or lack of status. See supra note 23. Even for illegal aliens, however,
who if apprehended by DHS would be deportable under those easier grounds,
avoiding deportability for a criminal conviction through careful planning at the
criminal court stage is vital and should not be neglected. This is because such an
illegal alien’s future ability to get Permanent Resident status will require proving
that the alien is “not inadmissible” to Permanent Resident status. While the
grounds of inadmissibility for criminal activity do not exactly match the grounds of
deportability for criminal convictions (the grounds of inadmissibility are broader,
see Section VI below), the two are similar and a proper analysis of immigration
consequences of crime should also take inadmissibility into account. Where
necessary below, this article discusses inadmissibility as well.
26. Following enactment of the Child Citizenship Act (CCA) of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-395 (2000) (codified at INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431), orphans adopted by
U.S. citizens who acquire Permanent Residence through an established procedure
assisted by USCIS automatically become U.S. citizens as well. This avoids the
problem of such children (and their U.S. citizen adoptive parents) thinking they
are U.S. citizens, only to discover as adults that they are still only Permanent
Residents and have unwittingly rendered themselves deportable by claiming to be
U.S. citizens, either through applying for a U.S. passport or through voting. The
CCA created exemptions from deportability for such unintentional claims to U.S.
citizenship by an adopted Permanent Resident. See, e.g., INA § 237(a)(6)(B), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6)(B). Yet, adopted children who turned eighteen prior to the
effective date of the CCA and who did not become automatic U.S. citizens under
the more restrictive pre-CCA law remain Permanent Residents; such aliens remain
subject to deportation for certain criminal convictions.
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27

into whether they may stay in the United States. Thus, the analysis
of deportability must be an integral part of strategizing criminal
defense at the outset of criminal proceedings. By the time an alien
with a criminal conviction comes to the attention of Homeland
28
Security, it may well be too late to prevent deportation.
III. THE CIVIL–CRIMINAL DIVIDE & THE COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE
Avoiding deportation due to criminal activity is complicated by
the fact that deportation proceedings are civil in nature, not
29
criminal. The civil–criminal distinction is a longstanding one in
American law; many of the constitutional protections in criminal
30
proceedings have not extended to civil court proceedings. As the
27. See infra note 36 (explaining that Cancellation of Removal under INA
§ 240A, 8 U.S.C. §1229b (a) is a discretionary form of relief that is categorically
barred if the Permanent Resident has a conviction for an aggravated felony).
28. It is, of course, wise for criminal defense counsel to determine whether a
client is in fact a U.S. citizen. While not common, some defendants are pleasantly
surprised to find out that they are in fact U.S. citizens without knowing it (as
compared to the more tragic situation). See supra note 26. There are provisions
for deriving U.S. citizenship automatically at birth even if not physically born in
the United States. See INA § 301, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. Or there is the possibility for
some Permanent Residents to acquire U.S. citizenship automatically before the
age of eighteen, even if they are not aware of it. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Because automatic acquisition of citizenship most often
hinges on the citizenship laws in effect at either the time of birth or time the
relevant triggering events occurred, and since U.S. citizenship laws have been
amended numerous times in the second half of the twentieth century, interested
practitioners are recommended to consult Daniel Levy’s comprehensive treatise
that compiles and analyzes past and current U.S. citizenship law. Daniel Levy, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK (2007 ed.). There is no better way to
win a deportation case than to prove that your client is a U.S. citizen and thus not
deportable.
29. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation
proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this
country, not to punish an unlawful entry.”).
30. See, e.g., Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997) (where a federal
agency imposed monetary penalties and occupational debarment on bankers,
then later criminally prosecuted the bankers for essentially the same conduct,
held, that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment was not implicated
because the federal administrative agency proceedings were civil, not criminal).
Deportation proceedings are administrative agency proceedings conducted by the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a part of the Department of
Justice. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2008). The immigration judges who hear
deportation cases are appointed by the Attorney General, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10
(2008); they are not Article III judges with lifetime tenure, and the quality of
decision making varies greatly. Recently the Department of Justice’s own internal
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) published an extensive report on the
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U.S. Supreme Court has famously stated, “it must be remembered
that although deportation technically is not criminal punishment . .
. deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes life worth
31
living.’”
The effect of this civil–criminal distinction is particularly
catastrophic in the case of immigrants facing deportation for
criminal convictions. Other civil sanctions such as debarment from
the practice of law, or forfeiture of property, leave a U.S. citizen
criminal defendant still able to earn some other livelihood in the
United States. But deportation means permanent exclusion from
the United States with almost no hope of ever returning, except to
32
visit briefly. Although deportation will be the near certain result
from incurring any one of a broad range of criminal convictions, it
is nonetheless deemed only a “collateral consequence” of the
criminal process.
The distinction between the direct consequences of a
conviction or guilty plea and the collateral consequences is a
allegations of politicized hiring for numerous positions within the Justice
Department, including Immigration Judges, commonly abbreviated as “IJs.” See
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AN
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND
OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008) www.usdoj.gov/opr/.
The position of IJ is a civil service position for which considering applicants’
political and ideological affiliations is not permitted; however, for a period of
several years, the Office of the Attorney General applied a political litmus test to
the hiring of IJs. In fact, the OPR concluded that “[t]he evidence showed that the
most systematic use of political or ideological affiliations in screening candidates
for career positions occurred in the selection of IJs [versus in other Justice
Department hires].” Id. at 137. The OPR report’s conclusion concerning the
hiring of Js stated that:
[i]n sum, the evidence showed that [Office of Attorney
General] employees [Kyle] Sampson, [Jan] Williams, and
[Monica] Goodling violated federal law and [Justice]
Department policy, and Sampson and Goodling committed
misconduct, by considering political and ideological affiliations
in soliciting and selecting IJs, which are career positions
protected by the civil service laws.
Id.
31. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945), (citing Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
32. Deportation from the United States for a criminal conviction will
generally (though not absolutely always) leave aliens permanently “inadmissible”
to the United States for the rest of their lives. See INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(2006) (inadmissibility grounds). There is the possibility of making temporary
visits to the United States in the future if a waiver is granted, but this waiver is
temporary and does not make it possible to apply for Permanent Residence in the
future. See INA § 212(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3).
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legitimate one—to require criminal courts to advise a defendant of
every possible collateral consequence under the sun could become
absurd. (E.g., “Your honor, when you accepted my plea of guilty to
solicitation of a prostitute it was a manifest injustice because you
did not advise me that my wife was likely to find out about it, and
now she’s divorcing me.”). If guilty pleas could be overturned
because a defendant was not advised of every single remote
possibility of pleading guilty, there would not be any finality to the
33
criminal court process.
Compared to lesser hardships such as the loss of a professional
license or forfeiture of property, though, deportation is arguably
not just a “collateral” consequence that might happen following
certain criminal convictions. Under present immigration laws, the
fact that an alien defendant will or will not become deportable is
34
near certain by the time criminal proceedings are concluded.
Where in the past there was the possibility of an immigration judge
granting a discretionary waiver by taking into consideration factors
35
such as the alien’s length of residence in the United States, at
present the relief from deportation that is available has been
almost entirely proscribed once the conviction passes a certain
36
threshold.
33. Procedurally, many of the claims by aliens that they were not advised of
the likelihood of deportation arise not at the trial court level itself but rather in
the form of motions to vacate guilty pleas after criminal proceedings are complete.
We will touch on the issue of vacating of pleas further below. See infra Part VII.
34. See infra note 36.
35. See INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c), repealed by Illegal Immigration
Reform & Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRAIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104208, INA § 304(b), 110 Stat. 3009, 3597 (1996). After much litigation, the
Supreme Court restored INA § 212(c) relief for aliens who had pled guilty prior to
April 24, 1996. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
36. The three most commonly triggered grounds of deportation for criminal
convictions are for Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (“CIMTs”), see INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), aggravated felonies, see INA
§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and controlled substance
offenses, see INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The “aggravated
felony” ground is defined by a very broad list of offense categories defined at INA
§ 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). The aggravated felony list is quite broad
and includes attempts to commit any enumerated aggravated felony, leading to
extreme results such as one recent case in which a Permanent Resident was
deportable for being convicted of an aggravated felony for an attempt to commit a
crime involving fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim(s) was more than
$10,000, even if the loss did not actually occur. See In re S-I-K, 24 I. & N. Dec. 324
(2007). The most commonly sought forms of relief from deportation in
immigration court are (ignoring for the moment the distinction between
Permanent Residents versus aliens with a lesser or no status and not including the
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Thus, we would submit that the reality of deportation (unlike
other “collateral consequences”) is that in almost black-and-white,
up-or-down fashion, the outcome of the criminal court proceedings
determines whether or not deportation will result. Though this
reality certainly is not the fault of the states, it is the present reality.
We submit that deportation should be considered a direct
consequence of criminal court proceedings that must be fully
explored and discussed between the judge, prosecutor and defense
attorney, and the alien defendant, before any plea is entered.
Much as we might like to see this shift in the law take place, we
must admit that this argument has not found traction in the courts.
In this regard, it is worth examining what the Minnesota Supreme
Court has held concerning deportation as a collateral consequence
of pleading guilty to a crime. In the Alanis case, defendant Roel
Alanis was a longtime Permanent Resident who pled guilty to
felony and misdemeanor offenses involving controlled substances
37
and welfare fraud. The nature of the offenses and the maximum
38
39
possible punishments made Alanis deportable.
The court
small category of family-based immigrants with the proper facts to “adjust status”
to Permanent Resident to avoid being deported): asylum, INA § 208, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158, cancellation of removal, § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b), withholding of
removal, § 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), withholding of removal under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT), see Pub. L. No. 105-277, Div. G, § 2242(a)
(1998); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16–.18), and for some nationalities, Temporary
Protected Status (TPS), see INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a). Each of these forms of
relief is either categorically or near effectively barred for aliens convicted of
aggravated felony crimes. See INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i)
(barring asylum), INA §§ 240A(a)(3) & (b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(a)(3) &
(b)(1)(C) (barring cancellation of removal), INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (barring withholding of removal in most cases). About the
only form of relief from deportation not barred by an aggravated felony conviction
is withholding under the CAT. See, e.g., In re J-F-F, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (2006)
(alien with aggravated felony conviction permitted to request withholding of
removal under CAT, though relief was denied due to a lack of evidence that it was
more likely than not the alien would be tortured if returned to his home country).
37. Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998).
38. Of the main deportation grounds for criminal convictions, one hinges
upon the maximum possible punishment for the particular crime (regardless of the
actual sentence imposed), see INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(a)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(a)(i)(II) (deportability for crimes involving moral turpitude “for
which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed”), while others hinge on
the actual sentence imposed, see, e.g., INA §§ 101(a)(43)(G) and
237(a)(2)(A)(a)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G) and 1227(a)(2)(A)(a)(iii)
(deportability for aggravated felony theft crime only if an actual sentence of one
year or longer is imposed), as interpreted by the BIA in In re Song, 23 I. & N. Dec.
173 (2001) (not deportable under INA §§ 101(a)(43)(G) and
237(a)(2)(A)(a)(iii) where a criminal court vacated the one year prison sentence
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agreed that Alanis indeed had not been warned of the possible
40
immigration consequences. That lack of a warning, however, did
not mean that Alanis’s plea was not intelligent, thus failing the
third prong of the test that a manifest injustice has occurred when
a guilty plea is made which is not accurate, voluntary, and
41
intelligent. Since Alanis’s guilty plea was accurate, voluntary, and
intelligent as to the direct consequences of his plea (i.e., the
maximum prison sentence to be imposed and the amount of any
fine), his lack of knowledge of the collateral consequence of
42
deportation did not constitute a manifest injustice. As the court
put it,
[I]t makes sense that deportation is not a direct
consequence of the guilty plea because deportation is
neither definite, immediate, nor automatic. Before a
resident alien [i.e., a Permanent Resident] such as Alanis
43
can be deported, the INS must exercise its discretion to
commence deportation proceedings and, prior to
deportation, there are various administrative procedures
44
which must be followed.
The reality, however, is that deportation is virtually definite,
immediate, and automatic. Contrary to the court’s assertion that
the decision whether or not to initiate removal proceedings against
a particular alien with a deportable criminal conviction is a pure
discretionary decision by DHS that might well not result in
deportation, the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly states:
“[I]n the case of an alien who is convicted of an offense which [sic]
makes the alien deportable, the Attorney General shall begin any
removal proceeding as expeditiously as possible after the date of
45
conviction.”
of an alien convicted of a theft offense and revised the sentence to 360 days of
imprisonment).
39. For the controlled substance offense convictions that Alanis pled guilty to,
deportability under INA § 237(a)(2)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1127(a)(2)(C) was certain.
40. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 579.
43. The INS was dissolved on March 1, 2003 and its functions were
transferred to DHS. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116
Stat. 2135 (2002).
44. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578–79.
45. INA § 239(d)(1); 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d)(1) (emphasis added). For criminal
court proceedings in federal court against an alien who is not a Permanent
Resident, the INA allows for the deportation order for an aggravated felony crime
to be entered as part of the very same criminal court proceeding, which further
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The use of “shall” (as opposed to “may”) confirms that the
deportation of aliens who are deportable for criminal convictions is
given the highest priority. And as noted earlier, once an alien
defendant is convicted of any of the wide range of crimes that
constitute an “aggravated felony” for immigration purposes, the
46
chances of escaping deportation are next to none.
Lest it seem that we are blaming the state courts for
unwittingly luring alien defendants into getting deported without
squarely confronting the issue, we will note that following the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Alanis, the Minnesota
Rules of Criminal Procedure were updated to require that all
defendants who intend to plead guilty first be advised that if the
defendant is not a U.S. citizen, a plea of guilty may result in
47
deportation. It must be noted, however, that these advisals are
made as part of a long list of advisals at the beginning of a hearing
at which a defendant generally already plans to plead guilty. Based
upon our own experience we are forced to question whether these
advisals truly “sink in” and result in alien defendants factoring in
the risk of deportation into their decision to plead guilty or not.
For an advisal about possible deportation to be more effective, it
should be required at the beginning of the criminal court process,
no later than the charging stage, with repetition later in the
proceedings before pleading guilty or proceeding to trial.
IV. THE BLURRING OF THE CRIMINAL–CIVIL DISTINCTION:
DEPORTATION AS AN INTENDED CONSEQUENCE
Even if federal and state case law will for the foreseeable future
continue to treat deportation as only a collateral consequence of a
criminal conviction or other disposition, the reality is that the civil–
criminal distinction is being eroded steadily. Or, to be more
accurate, in some recent instances the pretense of deportation
being a collateral consequence is maintained while the reality is
that criminal proceedings are undertaken with the desired
erodes the claim that deportation is not a direct consequence of the criminal
conviction. See INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228.
46. See supra note 36. Even if a criminal conviction happens to not belong to
the aggravated felony list, deportable convictions for crimes involving moral
turpitude or controlled substances weigh against granting discretionary relief from
deportation.
47. MINN. R. CRIM. P.15.01 ¶ 10(d) (2006). About half of the fifty states have
similar rules requiring that defendants be warned about possible deportation
consequences. See Kesselbrenner, supra note 4, at Appendix K.
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immigration outcome in mind.
Nowhere was this clearer than the recent mass prosecution of
illegal alien workers conducted in concert with the workplace raid
on the Agriprocessors kosher meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa,
in May 2008. Much has been written from various sides in the
debate(s) over illegal immigration about Postville and more
generally about the soundness and civility of using of workplace
raids as a deterrent to the hiring of illegal workers, and we do not
intend to rehash those arguments. The single issue that concerns
us here is the publicly documented reality that the criminal
prosecution of illegal alien employees at Agriprocessors was
intentionally structured to achieve a supposedly noncriminal
collateral consequence, i.e., deportation.
First consider a brief summary of the Postville raid and
criminal prosecution. On May 12, 2008, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement (ICE) executed a criminal search warrant at
the Agriprocessors plant, as well as a civil search warrant for aliens
48
illegally in the United States.
The coordinated effort was the
result of several months of collaboration between ICE and the
49
Within seventy-two hours of the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
initial arrests on immigration charges, U.S. Attorneys charged 306
workers on a variety of charges including alleged aggravated
identity theft, fraudulent use of Social Security numbers,
fraudulently using a Permanent Resident card, and other alleged
50
crimes. Despite the serious nature of the felony charges, barely a
week later on May 20, 2008, eighty-five of the defendants had
already pled guilty; of them, seventy-seven had been sentenced to
51
five-month prison terms. The joint effort between ICE and DOJ
was openly promoted by the agencies as designed to achieve a
particular immigration outcome: that the alien defendants who
pled guilty would be immediately deported after serving their five52
month prison terms or else face a trial on more serious charges,
which if convicted would also result in certain deportation after a
53
longer prison term. Aside from any concerns about the coercive
48. News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (May 12,
2008), http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/index.htm.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2008,
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080520waterloo.htm.
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
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54

nature of the proceedings and the appropriateness of using
identity theft statutes that are traditionally reserved for charging
those operating fraud rings versus those who commit identity theft
55
in order to work illegally, what is relevant for our brief
examination is that the criminal justice system and the immigration
enforcement system were working in lockstep to ensure that
aggravated felony convictions were secured and that deportation
was certain. This included the court invoking the not commonly
used judicial removal provision that allows a federal judge who has
convicted a non-Permanent Resident of an aggravated felony to
simultaneously enter an order of deportation without need for a
56
separate later proceeding before an immigration judge.
Again, without taking a position on whether it is appropriate to
57
expend law enforcement resources on the kind of tactics and mass
criminal court processing procedures employed in Postville to
58
enforce the restriction against hiring of unauthorized workers, for
54. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) criticized the proceedings as
involving “pressure cooker tactics” with scripted responses for the judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys prepared in advance. See Press Release, Am.
Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Obtains Government ‘Manual’ for Prepackaged
Guilty Pleas for Prosecution of Immigrant Workers in Postville, Iowa (July 31,
2008), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/workplace/36219prs 20080731.html.
55. It has been argued that merely making up a nine-digit number out of thin
air (which happens to coincide with a real person’s Social Security Number,
though not intentionally so) and using it to work illegally does not constitute
knowingly stealing that real person’s identity. Following the Postville raid and
mass prosecutions and several other similar high-profile raids employing similar
tactics, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in an Eighth Circuit case to
determine whether, to prove aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1), the government must show that the defendant knew that the
means of identification used belonged to another person. See U.S. v. FloresFigueroa, 274 Fed. App’x. 501, No. 07-2871 (8th Cir. Apr. 23, 2008) (per curiam),
cert. granted sub nom. Flores-Figueroa v. U.S., No. 08-108, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 7827
(U.S. Oct. 20, 2008). See also Associated Press, Justices Will Hear Identity-Theft Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008, and Adam Liptak, Justices Take Case on Illegal Workers and
Penalties for Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2008, at A14 (discussing potential
impact on Postville-type raids of a Supreme Court ruling on this issue).
56. See INA § 238, 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (2006).
57. According to a recent article in the Des Moines Register, ICE reported
that the cost of the Postville Raid was approximately $5.2 million. This figure
includes only the costs to the ICE agency specifically, and does not include any
further costs to the other agencies involved (e.g., DOJ & DOL), who declined the
Des Moines Register’s requests to provide cost figures for the Postville raid. See
William Petroski, Taxpayers’ Costs Top $5 Million for May Raid at Postville, DES
MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 14, 2008.
58. The requirement to verify a new hire’s authorization to work in the
United States specifically prohibits employers from trying to determine whether a
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purposes of this article we merely note that the Postville operation
shows that deportation is anything but a “collateral” consequence
of criminal proceedings. Instead of being a possible civil action
taken after the criminal justice process has run its course, the
present reality of criminal prosecution of aliens is that deportation
may be a virtual certainty or even intended outcome of criminal
59
prosecution. It is thus beholden upon counsel, and indeed we
would contend the courts and prosecuting bodies, to consider
openly the likely immigration outcome of any criminal prosecution
of an alien.
V. WHAT IS A “CONVICTION”? IT DEPENDS WHO YOU ASK . . .
60

For fans of the television drama Law and Order, the criminal
justice system appears neat and predictable. Bad guy commits
crime. Good cop solves crime. Good prosecutor fights against
zealous defense attorney, and jury pronounces an often just
decision. If producer Dick Wolf wanted to present an alternative
script filled with messy and unpredictable results, a Law and
Disorder of sorts, the defendant would be an alien. This is because
in the world of immigration law a “conviction” is not limited to a
formal plea of guilt or a verdict or finding of guilt by a judge or
61
jury, as it is under state law. Instead it encompasses a wide variety
new hire is a citizen or an alien, and requires the employer to focus only on
whether the new hire presents any of a wide range of documents establishing
identity and authorization to work. Thus, the requirement to show authorization
to work (the process of completing Form I-9 within three days of hire for any job
in the United States) applies to U.S. citizens as much as to aliens. See generally INA
§§ 274A–274B, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324(a)–1324(b).
59. The Ninth Circuit has overturned an alien’s federal court conviction for
fraud based upon defense counsel’s affirmative and gravely incorrect advice that
the alien defendant would not become deportable by pleading guilty. See U.S. v.
Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2005). In a 2004 decision, the New Mexico
Supreme Court went further and imposed an affirmative obligation on criminal
defense counsel to advise clients of the specific immigration consequences of
pleading guilty. See State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 805 (N.M. 2004) (“We hold
that criminal defense attorneys are obligated to determine the immigration status
of their clients. If a client is a non-citizen, the attorney must advise that client of
the specific immigration consequences of pleading guilty, including whether
deportation would be virtually certain. . . . An attorney's failure to provide the
required advice regarding immigration consequences will be ineffective assistance
of counsel if the defendant suffers prejudice by the attorney's omission.”)
(emphasis added).
60. See NBC, http://www.nbc.com/Law_&_Order/ (last visited Dec. 13,
2008).
61. MINN. STAT. § 609.02 subdiv. 5 (2006) (defining “conviction” under
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of dispositions that might surprise prosecutors and defense
attorneys alike.
To elucidate this difference between the meanings of
“conviction” in criminal law versus immigration law, it is important
to first understand the basic idea of what a conviction is as it applies
to all persons in the United States, citizens and aliens alike.
Minnesota Statute section 609.02 subdivision 5 defines a conviction
as either “a plea of guilty; or . . . [a] verdict of guilty by a jury or a
62
finding of guilty by the court.”
This is the generally accepted
definition understood by the public nationwide, as evidenced by a
simple online search of the term in non-lawyer resources. In
laymen’s terms “conviction” refers to the final judgment rendered
63
on the criminal after the plea of guilt. Final judgment includes
64
Where the
ascertainment of guilt by either judge or jury.
defendant either admits to guilt in a plea, or does not contest the
charge (also known as plea of nolo contendere), a judge accepts this
65
plea as admission of guilt. The regurgitation of these elementary
concepts in criminal law may seem unnecessary, but these basic
rules as to what is a conviction for citizens do not hold for aliens.
Let us now turn to the definition of “conviction” under
immigration law. The definition is much broader than what most
states would define as a conviction:
(A) The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien,
a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court
or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—
(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the
alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of
guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment,
penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be
imposed.
(B) Any reference to a term of imprisonment or a
sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include
the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a

Minnesota criminal law).
62. Id.
63. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 358 (8th ed. 2004).
64. See The Free Dictionary, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Criminal +conviction (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
65. See id.
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court of law regardless of any suspension of the
imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence
66
in whole or in part.
This definition is designed to work around well-accepted state
court procedures which allow a middle ground of “withholding
adjudication of guilt” that does not let a defendant off scot-free but
which provides one opportunity for a defendant (usually a firsttime offender) to avoid incurring a conviction under state law. For
example, for first-time drug offenders, the Minnesota Statutes allow
criminal court proceedings to be deferred without an adjudication
of guilt if the first-time offender pleads guilty and agrees to be
placed on probation and participate in a drug or alcohol abuse
67
Successful completion of the probation
awareness program.
period requires that the court dismiss the proceedings, and the
68
successful defendant thereby does not incur a conviction. Indeed,
the Minnesota Statutes go so far as to state that “[t]he discharge or
dismissal shall not be deemed a conviction for purposes of
disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law upon conviction
69
of a crime or for any other purpose.”
In the immigration realm, however, the immigration
definition of conviction clearly would support finding a “conviction
for immigration purposes” because this deferral procedure under
Minnesota law requires that the defendant plead guilty to receive
70
the deferral. When adding on the probation that is imposed as
part of this deferral, it is a restraint on the alien defendant’s liberty
that thereby satisfies the immigration definition of conviction.
Thus, we are left with the curious result that the immigration laws
rely on state law and state criminal procedures/proceedings to
create the “conviction” needed to make an alien defendant
deportable, but then promptly ignore the sovereignty of the states
to determine the boundaries of what is and is not a conviction
under that state’s laws. The immigration laws are satisfied to allow
the state to provide enough facts to find a “conviction” but then
66. See INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006) (emphasis added).
67. See MINN. STAT. § 152.18 subdiv. 1 (2007).
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. (for first-time offenders “after trial or upon a plea of guilty . . . the
court may, without entering a judgment of guilty and with the consent of the
person, defer further proceedings and place the person on probation upon
such reasonable conditions as it may require and for a period, not to exceed
the maximum sentence provided for the violation.”) (emphasis added).
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quickly turn a blind eye to any additional reality that the state itself
did not seek to impose a conviction and indeed allows for the
71
charges to be dismissed entirely for some first-time offenders.
In addition to this overly broad definition of conviction for
immigration purposes, the alien defendant facing criminal charges
also confronts the fact that for some immigration purposes, even
merely “admitting” facts sufficient to constitute a criminal
72
conviction is enough to be barred from the United States. This
stems from the fact that in order to secure either temporary
“nonimmigrant” entry to the United States, or especially to secure
Permanent Resident status (for which two distinct FBI criminal
background checks are performed), an alien must not be
73
“inadmissible.” As noted previously, “inadmissibility” is a slightly
different concept than “deportability” because an alien seeking to
enter the United States has less procedural rights than an alien
74
already admitted to the United States.
This diminished
procedural position applies as well to Permanent Residents who
have committed a crime and then travelled outside the United
States and have been apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border
75
Protection at the port of entry. Given that Permanent Residents
who have committed crimes must prove “admissibility” the next
time they travel outside the United States, proper strategizing
around the immigration consequences of criminal convictions
76
requires considering “admissibility” as well.
The main concern in this regard is the ground of
inadmissibility for crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and
controlled substance offenses, which reads in relevant part as
follows:
In general . . . any alien convicted of, or who admits having
committed, or who admits committing acts which constitute the
essential elements of—

71. In the next section we discuss the possibility of interceding in criminal
proceedings even earlier in the process, at the stage of pretrial diversion.
72. See INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (2006).
73. Id.
74. See supra note 25.
75. See INA § 101(a)(13)(C)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (defining
“admitted,” which places Permanent Residents who have committed crimes after
being granted Permanent Resident status into the same procedural position of
having to prove “admissibility” as if they had not already been admitted to
Permanent Resident status in the past).
76. See INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).
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(I) a crime involving moral turpitude (other than a
purely political offense) or an attempt or conspiracy
to commit such a crime, or
(II) a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to
violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled
77
substance . . . is inadmissible.
The italicized language goes even further beyond the
78
definition of conviction under the average states’ law. It is worth
considering several examples of “admitting” to crimes that will
make an alien inadmissible even if state law would not consider the
alien defendant to have anything close to a conviction.
First, consider an admission of having committed a crime,
even if the offender is not caught—this would be essentially the
same as a “conviction” for purposes of inadmissibility under
79
immigration law. One example of such an admission could be an
alien who admits to an immigration officer during an interview for
either Permanent Residence or for naturalization to U.S.
citizenship that she has forged a check belonging to her exhusband to pay for daycare for her young children since her
husband is a deadbeat who has skipped out on his child support
payments. Unfortunately, in Minnesota, forgery of a check
(depending on the amount) may be punishable with imprisonment
80
exceeding one year. Thus, even though no criminal proceeding
may have occurred at all, the requirement as part of either the
Permanent Residence process or naturalization process to admit to
having committed any crimes for which no prosecution occurred
81
may trigger a finding of inadmissibility or deportability.
77. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (emphasis
added). There are two exceptions to the CIMT ground of inadmissibility listed in
the next subparagraph of this statute: the “minors exception” and the “petty
offense exception,” the latter of which says this ground of inadmissibility does not
apply if the maximum possible punishment for the crime does not exceed one
year. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Thus, a
crime punishable as a “gross misdemeanor” under Minnesota law does not raise
inadmissibility under the CIMT ground because the maximum possible
punishment for a gross misdemeanor is up to exactly one year, but does not exceed
one year. MINN. STAT. § 609.02 subdivs. 2, 4 (2007).
78. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
79. Id.
80. See MINN. STAT. § 609.631 (2007).
81. For many years, the Form I-485 most commonly used to apply for
Permanent Residence through the INS/USCIS has asked applicants to disclose if
they have ever inside or outside the United States “[k]nowingly committed any
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Second, consider an admission of elements which when taken
together constitute a crime—this too is equivalent to having
82
incurred a conviction for purposes of inadmissibility.
As we
discuss in the next section, many pretrial diversion programs
require an admission in writing to all elements of a crime—such as
83
To ensure
theft—in order to participate in such programs.
compliance and to more efficiently conclude criminal court
proceedings if later the defendant does not comply with pretrial
conditions, prosecutors often require admissions of guilt with a
degree of specificity sufficient to constitute a plea of guilty prior to
84
Where
agreeing to entry in a pretrial diversion program.
admissions are made to each and every element of a crime, the
alien defendant has the equivalent of a conviction for purposes of
inadmissibility even if the charges are dismissed after successful
85
completion of the pretrial diversion program.
In summary, several types of admissions of guilt made to
criminal and immigration agents are deemed “convictions” or
“admissions” for immigration purposes and such convictions will
86
support exclusion from the United States. This is contrasted with
the regular understanding of “conviction” in the criminal justice
system as limited to pleas of guilty, no contest (nolo contendere); a
verdict of guilty by a jury or a finding of guilt by a judge, with any
one of these actions followed by the judge actually adjudicating the

crime of moral turpitude or a drug-related offense for which [they] have not been
arrested.” See USCIS, Application to Register Permanent Status or Adjust Status at
3, May 27, 2008, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf. A similar
question appears on the Form N-400 application for naturalization to U.S.
citizenship. See UCSIS, Application for Naturalization at 8, Oct. 15, 2007, available
at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/N-400.pdf. The USCIS’s own publication
provided to the public for explaining the naturalization process warns potential
applicants for naturalization that, if they have criminal convictions, then applying
for naturalization might result in being deported from the United States. See
USCIS, A GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION at 25, 2008, available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/article/M-476.pdf.
82. See INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
83. Pretrial diversions at the county level are authorized by Minnesota Statues
section 401.065 (2006). The statute itself does not require an admission to the
essential elements of the crime that would otherwise be charged, but the
requirement to admit or stipulate to those elements often is a requirement
imposed by the programs themselves. See infra Section VI.
84. See State v. J.Y.M., 711 N.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). See also
infra note 93.
85. See INA § 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
86. See INA § 101(a)(48)(A)(i)–(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(48)(A)(i)–(ii).
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87

defendant’s guilt on the record. To escape a conviction merely
for state law purposes is not sufficient to guard against immigration
88
consequences.
VI. PRETRIAL DIVERSION AS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE
Given how much broader the immigration definition of
“conviction” is, when the nature of the charges and the early
awareness of potential immigration impact permits, one vital
avenue to explore for avoiding near-certain deportability or
89
Justice and mercy are two
inadmissibility is pretrial diversion.
important but sometimes competing values when dealing with
criminal punishment. Mercy, as a value, plays a bigger role when
dealing with first-time offenders whose crimes are deemed partly
90
excusable and deserving of leniency. In the late 1960s, the final
report of the President’s Commission of Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice recommended the use of diversion
programs for benign offenders who did not deserve the full weight
91
of their punishments. Minnesota law allows for pretrial diversion,
which is defined as “the decision of a prosecutor to refer an
offender to a diversion program on condition that the criminal
charges against the offender will be dismissed after a specified
period of time, or the case will not be charged, if the offender
92
successfully completes the program.”
A pretrial diversion program is often lauded as a progressive
concept and allows first-time offenders to rehabilitate and
93
reintegrate into society.
In a pretrial diversion program, the
defendant is usually required to attend classes, complete
community service, or perform other related rehabilitative acts.
When the defendant completes the assigned tasks satisfactorily, the

87. MINN. STAT. § 609.02, subdiv. 5(1)–(2) (2006).
88. See INA § 101(a)(48)(A)(i)-(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A)(i)–(ii).
89. See supra note 83.
90. Id.
91. See John P. Bellassi, A Short History of the Pretrial Diversion of Adult Defendants
from Traditional Criminal Justice Processing Part One: The Early Years, NAT’L ASS’N OF
PRETRIAL SERV., http://www.napsa.org/publications/diversionhistory.pdf (last
visited Oct. 25, 2008).
92. MINN. STAT. § 401.065 subdiv. 1(2) (2006).
93. See id. at subdiv. 2 (mandating that the program be “designed and
operated to . . . reduce costs and caseload burdens . . . [and] minimize recidivism
among diverted offenders”).
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94

prosecutor dismisses the charges. For a U.S. citizen defendant,
the benefits of having no conviction on his or her record as well as
a chance to start over and make better choices are obvious. For an
alien defendant, however, completing a pretrial diversion program
does not necessarily eliminate the threat of deportation.
An alien’s participation in a pretrial diversion program will
most likely avoid a conviction for immigration purposes if the
prosecutor does not require an admission of guilt as a prerequisite
95
for participation in diversion programs. As discussed above, an
admission of guilt coupled with any restraint on liberty—such as
having to complete a specified drug or alcohol awareness
96
97
If a
program —is a conviction under immigration law.
prosecutor requires an admission of guilt to enter a pretrial
diversion program and this admission is recorded, then for
immigration purposes the alien’s participation in pretrial diversion
98
is deemed a conviction all the same. This is true even if, as a
result of successful completion of the diversion program, the
99
prosecutor drops the charges.
While the purpose of pretrial
programs is to permit first-time offenders to rehabilitate without
any criminal record on their file, where admission of guilt is
required to participate, the result has been that aliens who
94. See id.
95. See In re Grullon, 20 I. & N. Dec. 12, 14 (B.I.A. 1989). In this case the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) applied a prior definition of “conviction,”
which matched the two elements of the current definition in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(48)(A) (2000), for immigration purposes. Id. The
BIA held that where the record clearly indicated the alien did not plead guilty in
order to enter a Florida pretrial diversion program, which the alien subsequently
completed, the alien did not have a conviction for immigration purposes. Id. at
15. The definition of conviction was subsequently amended by the enactment of
INA § 101(a)(48)(A) to eliminate the third element described in the case. INA,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 322(a)(1) (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006)). Still, Grullon remains good law on the first element of
the definition of conviction, holding that diversion into a pretrial program without
a plea of guilty means the first element of the definition of conviction for
immigration purposes is not satisfied.
96. “[R]estraint of liberty was found to include incarceration, probation, fine
or restitution, and community-based sanctions such as rehabilitation programs,
work-release or study release programs, revocation or suspension of a driver’s
license, deprivation of nonessential activities or privileges, or community services.”
Grullon, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 14, n.3. See also supra note 70.
97. It is also a conviction for the issue of “inadmissibility,” as even without any
restraint on liberty just the admission alone may be enough to trigger
inadmissibility. See INA § 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
98. See id.
99. See id.
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participate in these programs have a conviction for immigration
purposes and may be deportable depending on the type of crime
100
committed.
As noted above, Minnesota law authorizes pretrial diversion
101
Of seven existing programs as of
programs at the county level.
102
November 1999, five required an admission of guilt.
Hennepin,
Ramsey, Anoka, Washington, and Dakota counties, which arguably
103
contain a large number of alien defendants, require admissions
104
105
of guilt, as does the Stearns County program.
Where an alien
defendant is being entered into a pretrial diversion program in an
attempt to stave off deportation, it would be best if such admissions
of guilt be limited to only a general statement acknowledging or
not contesting involvement (and indeed some states do permit
106
entering pretrial diversion without an admission of guilt). This is
an important point since an admission that does not rise to a full
admission of guilt or of committing acts sufficient to constitute the
107
elements of a crime may evade immigration consequences. Such
a general, non-specific admission, however, might not satisfy the
requirements of the prosecution for participation in the pretrial
108
If each element of the crime has to be admitted, then
program.
100. See INA § 212 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
101. See MINN. STAT. § 401.065, subdiv. 2 (2006).
102. See JESSICA SIMON & SARAH WELTER, REVIEW OF ADULT PRETRIAL DIVERSION
IN
HENNEPIN COUNTY, COUNCIL ON CRIME AND JUSTICE (1999),
http://www.crimeand justice.org/researchReports, (last visited Oct.18, 2008)
[hereinafter SIMON & WELTER].
103. See IMMIGRATION TRENDS IN MINNESOTA: POWER POINT PRESENTATION ON
IMMIGRATION (2003), http://www.demography.state.mn.us/immigration.htm.
104. The likely purpose of requiring admissions of guilt is so that a conviction
can be entered in the record if the terms of the diversion program are not met.
See SIMON & WELTER, supra note 102, at 23.
105. See JANELLE P. KENDALL, ADULT DIVERSION PROGRAM DESCRIPTION,
http://www.co.stearns.mn.us/documents/ AdultDivProgram.pdf (last visited Oct.
18, 2008).
106. See, e.g., ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION
PROJECT, INC. (2007), http://www.sfpretrial.com/eligibilitycriteria.html (last
visited Oct. 18, 2008) (“Acceptance of diversion and compliance with conditions
imposed shall not be deemed to constitute an admission of guilt.”). In Florida’s
Seventeenth Judicial District, a defendant seeking pretrial diversion must “provide
facts indicative of knowledge or conduct on the part of the Applicant consistent
with guilt” without explicitly admitting guilt. See MISDEMEANOR DIVERSION
PROGRAM, BROWARD SENIOR INTERVENTION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM, TRUANCY
DIVERSION PROGRAM AND D.W.L.S. DIVERSION PROGRAM, http://www.sao17.state.fl.
us/pretrial.htm (last visited Dec. 13, 2008).
107. See supra notes 68, 74, 77–78, 94 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Stearns County Adult Diversion Program Description supra note
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an alien might not be able to escape immigration consequences
such as removal from the United States.
VII. THE LIMITED POSSIBILITY OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
We feel we can speak for all immigration attorneys when we say
that we always prefer that for all aliens facing criminal charges that
the issue of deportability always be fully explored and strategized at
the start of the criminal court process. The reality, though, is that
for many aliens the realization that they have pled guilty to a crime
that makes them deportable with no hope of relief only comes after
the court’s acceptance of the plea and entry of judgment have
become final. In this all too common situation, many aliens turn to
post-conviction relief, seeking to vacate the plea of guilty so as to
subvert deportation.
There are substantive and equitable reasons for a court to
expunge or set aside a conviction so that a former defendant has
no criminal record. Where such relief is granted, the conviction
ceases to exist for most practical purposes, thus giving former
offenders a second chance to “straighten up and fly right” and not
be barred from many jobs due to the taint of a criminal record.
Under Minnesota law, expungement or “setting aside” of a
conviction refers to a former offender petitioning the criminal
court to seal the records and disallow disclosure of certain criminal
109
convictions. Setting aside a conviction is accomplished through a
pardon extraordinary, granted by the Board of Pardons and
effectively results in “setting aside and nullifying the conviction and
of purging the person of [the conviction], and the person shall
never after that be required to disclose the conviction at any time
or place other than in a judicial proceeding or as part of the
110
licensing process for peace officers.”
The restoration of civil
111
Minnesota
rights refers to one’s ability to vote and hold office.
state courts have identified means to rehabilitate the criminal
record of the individual when it is shown that he or she has
effectively shown to possess good moral character and has

105, at 4 (“To be eligible for the diversion program, the offender must . . . [a]dmit
guilt, acknowledge responsibility, and provide a FACTUAL BASIS REGARDING
THE OFFENSE.”) (emphasis in original).
109. See MINN. STAT. § 609A.01–02 (2006).
110. See MINN. STAT. § 638.02 (2006).
111. See MINN. STAT. § 609.165 subdiv. 1 (2006).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss1/11

26

Shenoy and Khakoo: One Strike and You're Out! The Crumbling Distinction between the

2008]

IMMIGRATION DISTINCTIONS: CRIMINAL OR CIVIL

161

112

integrated into society in a positive manner.
In addition, Minnesota courts also dismiss cases where a
defendant has pled guilty and the plea has been accepted, but
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment has been stayed and
the defendant placed on probation with perhaps payment of a fine
113
or restitution depending on the crime.
If the defendant
complies with the probation requirements, then the case is later
dismissed, and the former defendant is restored to the position that
existed prior to the commission of the crime (i.e., has no
114
conviction under Minnesota law).
Thus, there are several means through which a convicted
criminal can ultimately turn back the clock and remove convictions
from his or her record. The vast majority of these rehabilitative
115
procedures, however, have no effect for immigration purposes.
This is because for immigration purposes, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that the vacating of a criminal
conviction for reasons solely related to rehabilitation or
immigration hardships does not eliminate the conviction for
116
immigration purposes. Only if the conviction was vacated on the
merits on the basis of a procedural or substantive defect in the
underlying criminal proceedings would the action of the criminal
court to vacate the conviction be respected as having eliminated
the conviction for immigration purposes (and therefore in most
117
cases having eliminated the deportability).
Indeed, even if a
112. See, e.g., State v. Ambaye, 616 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. 2006) (“In addition
to statutory expungement under chapter 609A, Minnesota courts also have the
inherent power to expunge criminal records . . . ‘[by deciding] whether
expungement will yield a benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the
disadvantages to the public from the elimination of the record and the burden on
the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring an expungement order.’”)
(quoting State v. C.A., 304 N.W.2d 353, 354 (Minn. 1981).
113. See MINN. STAT. § 609.135 (2006 & Supp. 2007).
114. See, id. at subdiv. 2(f) (“The defendant shall be discharged six months
after the term of the stay expires, unless the stay has been revoked or extended
under paragraph (g), or the defendant has already been discharged.”).
115. One exception is a full, unconditional executive pardon, which is the one
rehabilitative action that does not vacate the conviction on its merits but
nonetheless serves to relieve the alien from deportability for an aggravated felony
conviction. INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2006 & Supp.
2008). If the nature of the elements of the crime separately also would trigger
inadmissibility in the event of future travel outside the United States, that
inadmissibility would not be cured by the pardon, which does not vacate the
conviction on its merits.
116. In re Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (2003).
117. Id. See also In re Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378 (2000) (according
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criminal court ostensibly states that it has vacated a conviction on
the merits due to a substantive or procedural defect, if the record
of the proceedings reflects an ulterior motive to avoid immigration
consequences, the action of the criminal court might still not be
given the full faith and credit it should be given.
On the other hand, if state law requires a defendant to be
advised that there may be immigration consequences to pleading
118
guilty and the defendant is not in fact so advised by the court,
then that is a substantive defect in the conviction. If that
conviction is then vacated on the merits, it is due to an error under
state law and not solely for immigration reasons, and thus the order
vacating the conviction will eliminate the conviction for
119
immigration purposes. Thus, for aliens who have pled guilty to a
crime that is now realized to cause deportability, it is vital to obtain
a complete copy of the criminal court records and transcripts of
hearings to determine if any such required advisal was given. Even
if a required advisal about immigration consequences was given in
a particular case, competent criminal appellate counsel should be
consulted to determine if there were any other substantive defects
(e.g., constitutional defects) in the record of conviction that would
warrant seeking post-conviction relief to vacate the conviction on its
merits for a reason independent of immigration consequences.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
As much as we might like to see deportation be considered a
direct consequence of pleading guilty and thus actively analyzed
and considered from the very start for all alien criminal
defendants, we acknowledge that to do so would require additional
resources that are presently unavailable to the criminal justice
system. To say the least, it requires a complex analysis to determine
exactly what final disposition of a criminal charge will or will not
affect
an
alien
defendant’s
deportability
(or
future
“inadmissibility”) and in some cases requires taking the alien
full faith and credit to a New York court’s vacation of a conviction under a statute
that was neither an expungement nor a rehabilitative statute).
118. See supra note 47.
119. See In re Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878 (2006) (holding that, where an
alien defendant was allowed to plead guilty in Ohio without prior instruction by
the court of possible immigration consequences in violation of Ohio Revised Code
§ 2943.031, a state court action vacating the conviction as provided for in the same
statute eliminated the conviction for immigration purposes because the state court
action was based on an underlying defect in the proceedings under state law).
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defendant’s country of origin into account. We are forced to admit
that is probably not realistic to expect federal and state district
court judges, prosecutors, and criminal defense attorneys to
become experts in immigration law. But at the same time we
cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that the immigration deck is
often heavily stacked against the criminal alien defendant,
especially one who might receive rather lenient treatment as a firsttime offender under state law.
In the end, most alien defendants must take the initiative to
either seek assistance from legal services organizations or from
private counsel who are sufficiently knowledgeable of immigration,
so that the possibility of deportation can be taken into
consideration as an integral part of plea negotiations or deciding
whether or not to proceed to trial. It is our hope that this article
helps to raise the awareness of all members of the bench and the
bar to this critical need in light of how closely entwined our
criminal justice and immigration enforcement systems have
become.
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